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Using management control to understand public sector corporate governance changes: 
localism, public interest, and enabling control in an English local authority 
 
Structured Abstract 
 
Purpose: Within the context of recent post-localism developments in English local 
government the paper shows firstly how management controls have become more enabling in 
response to changes in rules of public sector corporate governance, and secondly how 
changes in management control systems gave rise to new corporate governance practices. 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach: Theoretically the paper mobilises the concept of enabling 
control to reflect on contemporary changes in public sector corporate governance. It draws on 
the International Federation of Accountants’ (IFAC) and Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) new public sector governance and management control 
system model and data gathered from a longitudinal qualitative field study of a local authority 
in north east England. The field study used interviews, observation and documentation 
review. 
 
Findings: This paper suggests specific ways in which the decentralisation of policy making 
and performance measurement in our case local authority gave rise to enabling corporate 
governance, and how corporate governance and management control practices went some 
way to aid in the pursuit of the public interest. In particular it shows that the management 
control system can be designed at the operational level to be enabling. We notice the 
significance of global transparency for supporting corporate governance practices around 
public interest. This paper reaffirms that accountability is but one element of public sector 
corporate governance. Rather, public sector corporate governance also pursues integrity, 
openness, defining outcomes, determining interventions, leadership and capacity, and risk 
and performance management. 
 
Practical implications: Insights into uses of such enabling practices in public sector 
corporate governance are relevant for many countries in which public sector funding has been 
cut, especially since the 2007/08 global financial crisis. 
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Originality/Value: This paper introduces the concept of enabling control into the public 
sector corporate governance and control debate by fleshing out the categories of public sector 
corporate governance and management control suggested recently by IFAC and CIPFA 
drawing on observed practices of a local government entity.  
 
Key Words: Enabling Control, Local Government, Localism, Austerity, Management 
Control Systems, Public Sector Corporate Governance 
 
Article Classification: Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
This paper uses a management control perspective to shed light on some of the ways in which 
‘localism’, a programme of selective devolution of policy making from central to local 
government in England, has enabled local authority corporate governance practices to pursue, 
what we term, public interest. In the context of local government we define public interest as 
intended outcomes for stakeholders in line with the International Federation of Accountants’ 
(IFAC) and Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accounting’s (CIPFA) definition of 
public sector corporate governance as “the arrangements put in place to ensure that the 
intended outcomes for stakeholders are defined and achieved”  (IFAC & CIPFA, 2014, P. 8). 
This is a departure from corporate governance notions that focus on transparency and 
accountability (Brennan and Solomon, 2008) especially in the public sector (Ezzamel and 
Willmott, 1993; Eckersley et al., 2014; Ferry et al., 2015). It implies good governance in the 
public sector is not just being accountable according to certain formal criteria on reporting 
occasions, but rather it is to facilitate entities acting in the public interest at all times. IFAC & 
CIPFA (2014, p. 14) visualises this definition with a wheel that embraces seven principles 
(see figure 1).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
This ‘wheel’ representation diagram defines ‘acting in the public interest’ with reference to 
two governance principles located in the central ‘hub’ and five management control elements 
located in the ‘spokes’ of the wheel. The two governance principles are, firstly, strong 
commitment to integrity, ethical values, and the rule of law and, secondly, openness and 
comprehensive stakeholder engagement (IFAC & CIPFA, 2014, p. 10). The five elements of 
management control are defining outcomes, determining interventions, developing leadership 
and capacity, managing risks and performance, and implementing practices transparently and 
supporting delivery of effective accountability (IFAC & CIPFA, 2014, p. 10). The 
management control elements are justified by the idea that acting in the public interest 
involves concerns for the internal business practices of public sector agencies. It articulates 
concerns frequently voiced in the regulatory and policy making arena that have, thus far, only 
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been sporadically addressed in the academic discussion (Almquist et al., 2013; Saliterer and 
Korac, 2013).  
 
An arena of still on-going change of public sector corporate governance through which the 
connections between the hub of corporate governance and the spokes of management control 
have assumed new significance is the governance of English local authorities under the UK’s 
Conservative-Liberal Coalition central government localism agenda. Prior to the Localism 
Act 2011 the local authorities were controlled by the central government through externally 
specified audited performance management frameworks, but afterwards the Comprehensive 
Area Agreements were scrapped and the Audit Commission abolished. It is the contention of 
this paper that local authorities are still controlled by the central government but to a lesser 
extent. This is because decentralised powers to self-determine services are constrained by 
centralised control over funding and regulations on various statutory services. 
 
Nevertheless, the localism changes have opened up a space for local authorities to determine 
their own performance reporting in bottom up ways that can, potentially, enable the locally 
defined public interest to be served differently, albeit under conditions of austerity that mean 
it is local authorities themselves who have to mete out the cuts. It is in this context of 
austerity localism (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012) that we suggest the relevance of a 
management control concept—enabling control—for exploring some of the new ways in 
which public sector corporate governance is being practised in English local authorities. The 
notion of enabling control is still relatively recent (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004) and has been 
highlighted as a promising approach for future control research (Berry et al., 2009). It is 
founded on the idea that control systems should not treat their users—be they head office 
managers, branch managers, or shop floor and service workers—like automatons but instead 
reckon with their intelligence. Enabling systems do this by lending themselves to ‘repair’ 
through the users themselves in case something happens that was unforeseen by the control 
system designers. In this sense, the notion of enabling control is attuned to the governance 
task of defining control parameters. It thereby potentially blurs the boundaries between 
management control and governance. 
 
The aim of this paper is to show how changes to the rules for local authority corporate 
governance have given an impetus for changes to management control and how they have 
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served as a basis for newly emerging corporate governance practices. We document some 
initial difficulties in connecting measurements and management with political objectives, but 
also identify some emergent qualities of local authority governance practices that facilitate 
the pursuit and negotiation of emerging local priorities through which the public interest is 
defined. Borrowing from the management control literature, we term these qualities 
‘enabling’. It will be shown that the system can be designed at the operational level to be 
enabling rather than having to be established by the head office for business units (Ahrens 
and Chapman, 2004) or as a collaboration between head office and business units (Jorgensen 
and Messner, 2010).  
 
2. Mobilising the notion of coercive and enabling control in the context of corporate 
governance 
The distinction between coercive and enabling control is derived from Adler and Borys’ 
(1996) discussion of coercive and enabling bureaucracies. “The goal was to design successful 
interactions between people and [systems] rather than to design foolproof [systems], to help 
the user operate the system efficiently rather than to only protect the user from breakdowns 
[…] The parallels to the design of organisational technology are strong. Formal procedures 
do not have to be designed to make the work process foolproof” (p. 69).  
 
Adler and Borys (1996, p. 70) identify four generic features that distinguish coercive and 
enabling approaches: repair, internal transparency, global transparency, and flexibility. 
Repair refers to “the ease with which users can repair the process themselves rather than 
allowing the breakdown to force the work process to a halt” (p. 70). “The enabling logic […] 
generates procedures that facilitate responses to real work contingencies” (p. 71). “Internal 
transparency refers to internal functioning of the (system) as used by employees” (p. 72). 
“They provide users with an understanding of the underlying theory of this process by 
clarifying the rationale of the rules [in which] [l]ayered access is the key” (p. 72). “Global 
transparency refers to the intelligibility for employees of the broader system within which 
they are working. Procedures are therefore designed to afford them an understanding of 
where their own task fit into the whole” (p. 73).1 Regarding flexibility, “[t]he coercive 
                                                 
1 Note that Adler and Borys’ (1996) concepts of internal and global transparency are different from the concept 
of transparency in the IFAC & CIPFA (2014) framework and the UK government’s transparency agenda. 
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procedure manual defines in detail the specific sequence of steps to be followed” (p. 74) 
whereas, “[a]n enabling procedure manual assumes that deviations are not only risks but also 
learning opportunities” (p. 74). 
 
From these system features, Adler and Borys (1996) characterise as enabling a bureaucracy 
that (1) exhibits “flexibility” in the deployment of its rules, (2) helps organisational members 
understand the internal workings of their own task (“internal transparency”), and (3) how 
their task fits into the organisational mission and how it seeks to provide products and 
services (“global transparency”), and thus (4) remains open for situation-specific “repair” by 
those who are subject to the rules of the bureaucracy.  
 
Applying those four features to management control systems as bureaucratic sub-systems of 
organisations, Ahrens and Chapman (2004) develop the notion of enabling control systems. 
Building on this research work, in private sector management accounting literature it has 
shown that coercive control may be used in enabling ways through the use of system feature 
characteristics such as repair and flexibility (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004; Free, 2007; 
Chapman and Kihn, 2009; Jorgensen and Messner, 2010) and characteristics of the processes 
used in system design and implementation context (Wouters and Wilderom, 2008; Wouters 
and Roijmans, 2011). In addition the system design has been researched when established by 
the head office for business units (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004), as collaboration between 
head office and business units (Jorgensen and Messner, 2010) and when performance 
measurement systems can be adapted at the local level during development and 
experimentation (Wouters and Wilderom, 2008; Wouters and Roijmans, 2011). There has 
been less insight into comprehensive bottom up system design from operational levels.  
 
In contrast to the management control context, which exhibits relatively greater certainty over 
organisational objectives, the corporate governance context is characterised by the option to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Whereas Adler and Borys are interested in how bureaucracy can create transparency by making available to 
workers information about the functioning of their various work processes and how they contribute to the 
organisational mission, IFAC & CIPFA (2014) is concerned with making data available to citizens to facilitate 
the definition of the public interest through public debate. A third notion of transparency underlies the UK 
government’s transparency agenda. It requires that local authorities publish online all transactions over a stated 
amount so that interested citizens might act as ‘armchair auditors’ who can scrutinise local authority spending. 
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reflect fundamentally on the nature and importance of the claims of different stakeholders on 
the organisation and how those claims ought to be balanced or ranked. In this sense the 
notion of enabling organisational members to use organisational systems flexibly to improve 
transparency of operations and pursue organisational goals under varying circumstances 
would appear as applicable to corporate governance systems as it is to management control 
systems. For just as enabling management control systems can find ways of making financial 
performance information, which is often intended for external communication, relevant for 
management purposes, enabling corporate governance systems could likewise translate 
external governance reporting concerns with accountability, transparency and ethics into 
organisational practices that are relevant and helpful for task completion (Ahrens, 2008).  
 
An important caveat applies, however. The distinction between coercive and enabling control 
can be muddled by the capitalist context in which it is found. Adler (2012), in a recent 
reflection on the literature that has been spawned by Adler and Borys’ (1996) initial 
distinction between coercive and enabling, observes that bureaucratic systems often exhibit 
coercive and enabling features simultaneously. For example, a total quality management 
system may treat its workers as smart contributors to the overall productive effort and support 
them with education, problem solving tools, quality circle budgets, etc., and thus be perceived 
as enabling to achieve excellent task performance. At the same time, however, workers may, 
at least in part, perceive this management system as coercive because in a context of capitalist 
competition it may be geared towards continuously tightening the targets for production tasks 
(cf., Arnold, 1998). This would send a conflicting message: The worker is not only a smart 
contributor but also a Chaplinesque cog in the wheel of ‘the great machine’. 
 
Our study is different from the context considered by Adler (2012) in two respects. By 
studying enabling corporate governance with management control elements, instead of just 
enabling management control, we are not taking existing stakeholder trade-off arrangements 
as given. We are looking, in part, at situations in which specific management control 
parameters are defined by corporate governance. The enabling nature of work extends to the 
definition of objectives, not just the activities by which given objectives are pursued, for the 
very design of the enabling control system lies in the hands of those local authorities whose 
performance is going to be controlled by the central government.  
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Furthermore, by studying corporate governance in a local authority we are avoiding the 
structural constraints of the capitalist context considered by Adler (2012). Even though public 
sector corporate governance in England under the current conditions of austerity means that 
budgets operate under tight spending constraints, those constraints are not applied on the 
basis of a surplus distribution system that seeks to maximise shareholder payoffs. Public 
sector funds are not capital that seeks the highest return. Rather, within the constraints of 
central government funding and statutory requirements, priorities are subject to processes of 
political negotiation and funds are frequently spent strategically to generate political returns 
for the incumbent government (Ahrens and Ferry, 2015, 2016). The actors in our study do 
therefore not explicitly work with capitalist priorities for the uses of funds. 
 
3. The English local authority corporate governance context 
In our research into potentially coercive and enabling aspects of local authority corporate 
governance in England we found various rules for personal conduct, organisation 
arrangements and inspection regimes from prior to the Localism Act 2011. 
 
Following the Localism Act 2011 local authority performance reporting requirements have 
become much less specific than they had become over the almost fifteen years of the previous 
New Labour government. This is because the Conservative-led Coalition government 
reduced external audit’s role, disbanded centrally imposed rules for performance reporting by 
local authorities such as Comprehensive Area Agreements, and devolved greater decision 
making powers to local authorities (Ferry and Eckersley, 2015; Ferry and Murphy, 2017). 
Using IFAC & CIPFA’s (2014) framework we aim to show the effects of the changes 
brought about by localism on local authority corporate governance.  
 
Three decades ago Hopwood (1983) suggested the significance of the external origins of 
internal accounts, especially for accounting and governance in the public sector (Hopwood, 
1984). Internal accounts would include management control systems, whose processes can be 
both designed and used by corporate governance practices. The impact of accounting change 
in the public sector has been well documented (Humphrey and Miller, 2012) including to 
show the effects of centrally imposed performance regimes on local authorities (Ferry et al., 
2015). Little attention, however, has thus far been given to the issue of management controls 
of the public sector (Ahrens and Khalifa, 2015; Ferry et al., 2017; Modell, 2012; Moll and 
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Hoque, 2011) and especially controls that are used “in pursuit of the intended outcomes for 
stakeholders” (IFAC & CIPFA, 2014, p. 8) and thus form part of its corporate governance.  
 
Conceptual efforts by international professional accounting bodies (IFAC & CIPFA, 2014) 
suggest that defining priorities, determining interventions, leadership and capacity, and risk 
and performance management are not only management control systems, but part of 
internalised corporate governance practices that are affected by and in turn facilitate 
transparency and accountability to help ensure organisational actions are in the public 
interest. They thus envision management control in the service of the broader definitions and 
principles of public sector corporate governance.  
 
Those suggestions should be seen in the context of a global shift from government to 
governance within the public sector. The introduction of governance highlights a change in 
the meaning of government: It could become a process of governing or a changed condition 
of ordered rule or a new method by which society is governed. When specifying this process, 
condition or method, various elements of governance matter.  
 
In this paper we focus on corporate governance, which remains relatively neglected in public 
sector accounting research. Whereas accounting researchers tend to focus on accountability 
and transparency, audit, monitoring, and incentive arrangements for governance toward 
external stakeholders (Ferry et al., 2015), much less attention is given to the uses of 
accounting, performance measures, and managerial rules for corporate governance (for 
exceptions, see, e.g., Saliterer and Korac, 2013; Tremblay, 2012) and the implications for 
corporate governance practices and management control (Roussy, 2013).  
 
Nevertheless, numerous accounting based regulatory reports on public sector corporate 
governance in the UK and internationally now emphasise the importance of achieving overall 
outcomes to address public interest concerns and not just individual elements of governance 
such as accountability (Bergmann, 2012; CIPFA, 2010).  
 
4. Research context, approach, and methods 
Within the context of ‘austerity localism’, i.e., between 2010 and 2014, a field study of 
corporate governance was conducted in the local authority administration of Newcastle City 
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Council (NCC). It is the local government authority for Newcastle upon Tyne, a city 
metropolitan borough in Tyne and Wear, North East England.  
 
NCC was then, and still is, controlled by the main opposition party, Labour. It consists of 
seventy eight councillors, three for each of the city's twenty six wards. The city is at the urban 
core of the Tyne and Wear conurbation, with an estimated net revenue budget for 2012/13 of 
c. £265 million and a city metropolitan borough population of c. 280,000, within the Tyne 
and Wear population of c. 1.1 million (Office for National Statistics 2013 estimate). The 
council delivers a full range of services. NCC is a member of the English Core Cities Group 
and, together with Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council, the Eurocities network of 
European cities.  
  
To study corporate governance at NCC, the research used interviews, observation and 
documentation review from a field study that covered over four years. The study involved a 
total of fifty interviews with staff from governance, finance, performance measurement and 
functional areas, which took place within the context of localism and austerity.  Interviews 
discussed governance, strategy and the role of accounting for management control and 
corporate governance. Interviews were supplemented by many more informal conversations 
that continued with local authority staff during the study and up to the time of submitting this 
paper for publication. Observations of governance, finance and performance practices, and 
general office practices, were also made by one researcher who is a qualified accountant with 
former senior level local government and civil service experience. In addition, the researcher 
attended large demonstrations and formal and informal meetings of various campaign groups 
who were lobbying against cuts in budget allocations. Current and historical documentation 
was reviewed to triangulate data from interviews and observations.  
 
The analysis of the data started during the field research. Data was organised by themes that 
were initially derived from the original research interests. Different attempts were made to 
weave themes into a theoretical narrative that would contribute to contemporary discussions 
in accounting research. Here the focus lay on thinking through the conditions and 
implications of having performance measures designed by the functional areas themselves 
(Ahrens, 2004). In this context we were initially intrigued by the subjects’ often vague 
references to performance measures as a way of developing policy as well as service 
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provision targets. In seeking to conceptualise the subjects’ experience of corporate 
governance processes (Ahrens and Khalifa, 2013) we came to conceive of developments in 
the field as an issue of newly developing forms of public sector corporate governance 
paralleled by newly emerging management control systems. Having been aware of various 
accounting bodies’ attempts at building conceptual bridges between governance and control 
we resolved to write a case study that would be able to flesh out their attempts. The 
theoretical resources for this we borrowed from the enabling management control literature 
because it helped us think about the performance measurement design activities in the field 
and offered a template for conceiving of the management uses of corporate governance 
information. 
 
In this process of narrativising our research we proceeded in accordance with quality criteria 
for conducting good interpretive research (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Ahrens and Dent, 
1998). The making of themes and patterns began during the initial data collection stages. As 
additional data was collected and analysed, a more detailed and systematic analysis was 
continuously undertaken of transcribed interviews, archival documents and contextual data 
ensuring all relevant information was considered in the emergent patterns.  
 
The following two sections present and discuss our research findings.  
 
5. Corporate governance through decentralisation of policy making and performance 
measurement 
Following the abolition of much of the central government targets for specific policy 
measures under localism, local authorities have had to determine what aspects of 
performance to measure and how. NCC, the local authority which we studied, used to have a 
corporate performance measurement team to ensure compliance with central government 
targets. However, the corporate performance measurement team was disbanded as there was 
no longer a perceived need to address national frameworks, benchmark criteria and 
auditability of performance that would result in league table comparisons. This meant some 
staff were made redundant and others transferred to different roles. This obviously led to 
some resistance as trade unions were against redundancy and career paths of staff were 
fundamentally altered. Nevertheless, the transfer of some of the staff into functional areas 
was done to assist in establishing benchmarks that were now localised and reported 
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internally. This was a cultural re-orientation. As a result some functional areas employed 
Outcome Based Accountability as a management control system. Staff training was given in 
this management control system to assist with its implementation and use, and as a means to 
overcome resistance by highlighting empowerment of the more decentralised nature of 
management control.  
… there is a bit of a revolution internally… we have changed performance 
measurement to ‘Outcome Based Accountability’… Initially this was adopted mainly 
by Children’s Services and Adult and Community Services, which are the largest 
functional areas measured by budgets… who understood the profession and planning 
for their functional area rather than the generalists who did performance measurement 
for all functional areas from the corporate centre… (Performance manager from 
corporate centre) 
 
Performance measurement was decentralised to functional areas in order to encourage a 
bottom up determination of performance measurement within the local authority. This is an 
important dimension of the enabling potential of corporate governance and management 
control because it enables flexibility at a functional area level. Corporate control is retained 
only in so far as functional results must comply with a cash limit budget. This, rather than 
operational measures, is now monitored by the central finance function. Hierarchical 
compliance is therefore no longer seeking to fulfil detailed central government performance 
targets but only the overall local authority budget constraint. 
 
The main changes in the local authority’s corporate governance practices brought about by 
the change from centralism to localism are illustrated in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Using the IFAC & CIPFA (2014) hub and spokes framework, table 1 highlights that the 
relationship between central government and local government is predominantly one between 
the controlling and the controlled. This was the situation under centralism and remains the 
case after the shift to localism.  
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However, whereas prior to localism coercive control dominated all aspects of the relationship 
between central and local government, some corporate governance and management control 
elements have since begun to be locally determined, such as how to conduct consultations, 
define outcomes, determine interventions, or define performance and risk measures. Insofar 
as the capacity for such local determinations is intended to produce outcomes that are more 
suitable for the local population they represent shifts to relatively more enabling control to 
meet the public interest.  
 
Since we are interested in emerging corporate governance and management control changes 
post localism this paper will focus on the enabling changes, in particular how the local 
authority uses any areas of new found autonomy to incorporate any elements of enabling 
management control, i.e., flexibility, local and global transparency, and repair, into their 
corporate governance practices. 
  
The headings for the coming subsections are based on the ‘hub and spokes’ framework to 
help us organise the fieldwork material in a meaningful way. Throughout the data section we 
pursue the theme of how, in the various specific contexts, the public interest is constituted 
and its pursuit facilitated through corporate governance practices.  
 
Hub of the Wheel 
(1) Integrity, Ethics and the Law 
Local government as an institution, local politicians and officers, staff, and those who carry 
out its services in various relationships whether commercial or otherwise are expected to 
have a “strong commitment to integrity, ethical values and the rule of law”. Many of the 
statutory controls, laws and codes of conduct from prior to the Localism Act remain in place, 
emphasising the controlling role of central government. 
 
However a significant change concerned winding up of the centralised Standards Board for 
England that oversaw a code of conduct of ethical standards in local government and retained 
an independent national overview of local authority investigations into allegations.  
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In accordance with the Localism Act 2011, “NCC has established a standards committee with 
arrangements for addressing any allegations against local politicians” (Head of Governance 
and Information). All complaints alleging members have breached their code of conduct must 
be made to the monitoring officer who decides whether it merits investigation. Independent 
persons are involved in the decision making. Detailed procedures are published online. 
 
Since the arrangements are designed to support NCC officers make contextually sensitive 
decisions about standards and ethics and give guidelines on what constitutes breaches they 
potentially enhance global transparency and provide a means of repair. 
 
(2) Openness and Comprehensive Stakeholder Engagement 
“Openness and comprehensive stakeholder engagement” remain key elements of acting in the 
public interest under localism, but arrangements have changed. Prior to the Localism Act 
2011 NCC already practiced openness with regards to publishing online all their decisions, 
associated rationales, and potential impact and implications, plans, actions, resource use, 
forecasts, output and outcomes unless it was restricted under rules in the broader public 
interest. Citizens could request data under the Freedom of Information Act.  
 
Localism forced greater openness on local authorities. The Code of Recommended Practice 
for Local Authorities on Transparency 2011 committed them to publish data on all 
expenditure over £500, senior salaries, councillor allowances, policies, performance, external 
audits and key inspections and key indicators on the authorities’ fiscal and financial position, 
and data on the democratic running of the local authority.  
 
NCC has also added new mechanisms for stakeholder engagement as part of global 
transparency, particularly through ‘Let’s talk’, which was presented as “a new conversation 
with our city” (Leader of the Local authority). It offered an interactive forum for 
accountability based on citizens’ and other stakeholders’ involvement. 
 ‘Let’s talk Newcastle’ involves a range of activities that will take place across all 
wards in the city. These will allow more coordinated conversations to take place at all 
levels, which ultimately link the things local people raise, with the big policy 
decisions we take. (Leader of the Local authority in launch event speech for Let’s talk 
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Newcastle, 12 July 2011, 
http://www2.newcastle.gov.uk/wwwfileroot/cxo/consultation/LetstalkNewcastlelaunch
NickSpeech.pdf) 
To link the things that local people raise with the policy decisions taken by NCC there are 
four types of activities taking place. ‘Talkabout’ is a series of conversations with stakeholders 
about what they think the future priorities should be. ‘Walkabout’ consists of visits to 
communities and local services and get to know local issues.’Thinkabout’ seeks information 
and advice from people about the local authority’s strategic issues. ‘Decideabout’ gives local 
people the opportunity to be involved in decision making, for example, through ward 
committees, public meetings, etc. ‘Let’s talk Newcastle’ online provides an online 
community engagement tool. Additionally, stakeholders can get involved online through 
email, twitter, facebook, and by telephone, in writing, and in person. 
In addition to engaging individual citizens and service users through ‘Let’s talk’ in defining 
outcomes, there were also budget participation meetings to help determine interventions and 
engagement with institutional stakeholders such as trade unions, chamber of commerce and 
the core cities group of local authorities to lobby central government on the fairness of 
funding settlements. This global transparency was therefore not specific to NCC, but 
institutionalised across the local government field. 
 
However, NCC were accused of creating ‘Let’s talk’ and other means of engagement simply 
for show, to legitimate their spending cuts, rather than as a sincere means of listening to the 
people of Newcastle and actually facilitating their input into policy decisions. For example 
Liberal Democrat opposition leader David Faulkner proposed,  
…scrapping the Let’s Talk programme….. We believe that the Council’s budget 
consultation is seriously deficient, as there is hardly any change after three months of 
consultation and controversy….. (Liberal Democrats, Spring 2013 Focus Newsletter, 
https://davidfaulkner.mycouncillor.org.uk/files/2013/10/Fawdon-Focus-Spring-2013-
final.pdf).  
 
In addition, some protestors made their feelings clear with regards to the consultation 
programme. For example, in December 2012 the national campaign group Coalition of 
Resistance organised a demonstration with a march to the civic centre. Some protestors then 
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went on to stage a sit in at a Newcastle Council meeting that became known as the ‘storming 
of the stage’. 
 
Undoubtedly ‘Let’s talk’ served to some extent as a means to manage expectations of what 
could be delivered within funding and non-statutory service constraints, and as a means to 
highlight to the citizens that the controlling central government, not the controlled local 
authority, had determined the scale of the cuts.  
 
Some of our data is suggestive of genuine NCC consultations, however. Examples of policy 
changes following consultation include the retention of the respite care budget for vulnerable 
adults following specific engagement with campaign groups, co-optation of citizens into 
helping to run libraries as an alternative to closure, and a pump priming arts fund as a vehicle 
for encouraging greater private philanthropy. On those occasions there appeared to be strong 
connections between the issues raised by local people through the new channels of 
communication and NCC policy decisions. ‘Let’s talk’ enhanced transparency for NCC 
officials by clarifying the views and preferences of service users and residents. It also 
enhanced the transparency of Council decisions and actions for residents who became, if not 
decision makers, advocates with clearly formalised channels of consultations and, in some 
cases, participation. 
  
Spokes of the Wheel 
(3) Defining Outcomes 
To act in the public interest, the planning element of corporate governance practices 
constitutes defining outcomes in terms of sustainable social, economic and environmental 
benefits, and determining the intervention necessary to optimise the achievement of intended 
outcomes (IFAC & CIPFA, 2014, pp. 19, 21). 
 
Under the Localism Act 2011, local authorities have more control over how they define their 
outcomes for non-statutory services, but the outcomes for statutory services are still 
controlled by central government. They specify minimum service levels through centrally 
determined rules and regulations. In the context of reduced austerity budgets most resources 
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are consumed by statutory services. The local authority is left with control over outcomes that 
account for a smaller share of the resources. 
 
At NCC, to define outcomes under austerity localism, the Leader of the City Council 
launched a Fairness Commission in July 2011.  
For communities to thrive people must feel they are being treated fairly and have 
equal chances… Faced with the challenges of making hard decisions with shrinking 
resources, the leadership of the local authority has sought advice from a Fairness 
Commission.  The approach has been to define some principles to improve decision 
making, and provide guidance. (Chris Brink, Vice Chancellor of Newcastle University 
and Chair of the Fairness Commission) 
 
In January 2012 the local authority held a special cabinet meeting to debate the principles of 
fairness. It was attended by around one hundred residents and some Commission members.  
 
The planning work of the Fairness Commission helped to define outcomes, but not in 
isolation as was shaped by development of local authority priorities and public engagement 
and consultation through ‘Let’s talk’ that in its first year involved over eight thousand 
residents in debates about the future of the city helping determine interventions.   
 
NCC’s corporate governance practices exhibited innovation in defining outcomes based on 
overarching principles devised by a Fairness Commission. The Commission’s principles and 
guidelines engendered additional flexibility to adjust some of the policies through which the 
city was controlled and resulted in greater global transparency for processes of negotiation 
and mediation in which various interventions were determined. 
 
(4) Determining Interventions 
By scrapping the centralised performance management frameworks that imposed outcomes 
based on performance indicators the Localism Act 2011 gave local authorities more control 
over interventions.  
I think with the change to the Coalition government and their localism agenda, it’s 
almost like the central government is saying... Get rid of the bureaucracy and really 
talk about accountability to local people and about your own localism and your own 
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priorities at your [local authority] level… (Performance manager of a functional 
area) 
However, local authorities are still controlled by the central government through funding 
constraints. For example, the level of revenue support grant from central government largely 
determines the overall level of interventions that are possible, and specific grants are ring-
fenced for particular activities. Other key sources of local authority funding, such as the 
National-Non Domestic Rates from businesses and Council Tax from private households 
remain subject to central control thereby limiting the local authorities’ ability to locally raise 
funding for specific interventions. 
 
Nevertheless, local authorities now have more control over interventions within funding 
constraints. In determining interventions NCC set out a three year medium term financial 
plan (2013-16), and annual budget (2013/14) which became subject to extensive consultation. 
It received over fifty thousand responses, underlining the serious interest of citizens in 
defining the public interest. The Full Council met in March 2013 and agreed its budget 
programme for 2013-14. Full details were posted online. 
 
The ‘Let’s talk’ initiative was central to the planning of the three year medium term financial 
plan and setting of the annual budget. There was extensive consultation with local people 
around public sector spending cuts, how this might impact on local services and community 
engagement. In November 2012, proposals were published on the Council website in advance 
of the November Business Cabinet meeting during which the budget was scheduled to be 
approved for consultation. Those proposals did not go unnoticed: Demonstrations by citizens 
commenced in the following week. Adverts were placed in the local press in December 2012 
and January 2013 informing stakeholders about these developments and emails were sent to 
residents, partners, voluntary and community sector organisations and other key stakeholders 
within the city, directing them to the budget website. Regular briefings took place with the 
local press in advance of and throughout the consultation period to raise awareness of the 
proposals and to encourage people to have their say. Stakeholders were encouraged to 
respond through a variety of media. Formal consultation closed in February 2013. A separate 
report was produced on what spending priorities the local authority had been able to change 
following consultation. For example NCC reversed a proposal and protected respite care for 
vulnerable adults, they agreed a pump prime funding pot for the arts and encouraged 
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philanthropy, and they co-opted campaigners into the operational running of libraries. The 
report was published alongside the post consultation budget ready for discussion and 
approval by Full Council in March 2013, for the start of the new financial year in April 2013. 
 
The local authority’s corporate governance practices therefore exhibit flexibility with regards 
to post-consultation shifts of budgets and adjustments to services. They facilitate global 
transparency through consultation, negotiation and mediation in determining interventions 
linking this management control element of corporate governance with the public interest 
regarding changes of spending priorities and management of expectations. 
 
(5) Leadership and capacity 
The Localism Act 2011 provided more control for local authorities over leadership and 
capacity as they are freed up from managing based on centralised performance management 
frameworks and centrally determined performance indicators. In particular it extends the 
power of local authorities to 'do anything that individuals generally may do' as long as that is 
not limited by some other Act.  
 
However, NCC’s capacity is restricted by funding constraints, which are controlled by the 
central government, and designated statutory roles and responsibilities supporting both 
central government top-down control of local authorities and local authority functional area 
bottom-up control of the local authority’s corporate centre. For example, the statutory roles 
and responsibilities of the local authority’s Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer 
and Monitoring Officer represent a centralised top-down control element. The local authority 
is legally obliged to maintain a balanced budget and the Chief Financial Officer discharges 
this statutory function. Additionally, the statutory requirements for the roles and 
responsibilities of the Director of Children’s Services and the Director of Adult Services, 
whose functional areas are by far the largest, create a set of bottom-up constraints on the local 
authority’s corporate leadership. In resolving its diverse responsibilities and obligations the 
local authority’s corporate governance practices seek to provide internal transparency with 
regards to understanding the budgets of each functional area and what it ought to be capable 
of achieving, and global transparency for the overall local authority budget, which must 
remain balanced. While the corporate centre finance function is responsible for repair of the 
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overall budget, the operational directors must highlight concerns of statutory risks to their 
performance and discharge of their obligations. 
 
In addition to stipulations on key leadership roles to ensure that the local authority acts within 
the law and uses its resources wisely, local authorities are also still controlled in terms of 
codes of conduct, constitution, and committees that were in place pre-localism, and NCC has 
a nomination, remuneration and audit committee. 
 
Nevertheless, at a strategic leadership level, the Localism Act 2011 provided an opportunity 
to establish a ‘combined authority’ with other local authorities in the region and thereby seek 
provision for a further transfer of powers that would result in an additional devolution of 
authority from the UK's central government. This was a new flexibility to enter into inter-
organisational arrangements and enabled framing of issues in relation to the combined 
authority rather than just the local authority adding further transparency to the workings of 
social and economic processes and their outcomes. 
 
(6) Managing risks and performance 
The Localism Act 2011 means local authorities no longer face detailed central government 
performance management systems and performance audits, but they have to achieve a 
balanced budget. In turn the local authority corporate centre passed responsibility for 
performance measurement to the functional areas. The functional areas of Children’s Services 
and Adult and Community Services tailored their own performance measures using Outcome 
Based Accountability. It allows them to plan, measure and report those indicators that help 
them manage risks and performance in their localised task environment. Used in this way, 
Outcome Based Accountability qualifies as an enabling management control system because 
it enhances local and global transparency and facilitates repair.  
 
Unlike in the private sector management control studies, however, where enabling systems 
were designed by head office for operational units (e.g. Ahrens and Chapman, 2004) or in 
collaboration between central and local units (e.g. Jorgensen and Messner, 2010), in our 
example the design of the system itself became an important element of the enabling nature 
of the corporate governance practices for the functional area. Performance management 
systems and targets are not now merely implemented for hierarchical accountability 
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relationships between the corporate centre and business units, but instead there is a local 
ownership of performance management, empowerment, and operations, all of which 
informed strategy. For example, the local ownership of performance management meant an 
Outcome Based Accountability template was developed autonomously within the two main 
functional areas of Adult and Community Services and Children’s Services.  
Okay, what is the outcome you are trying to achieve, what are the measures that 
enable you to make a proxy assessment for how well you are performing against the 
outcome? What’s the story behind the data?  Who were the partners involved, what’s 
working and what’s not?  And those are the kind of main questions … for measures 
where our performance might be good or where there is a financial pressure around a 
measure they are highlighted separately on an individual template for specific 
consideration. (Functional area performance manager) 
 
In such ways the functional areas developed and managed their own key performance 
indicators and were empowered to determine which aspects of their operations should be 
reported to the corporate centre. 
 
However, the removal of the central government’s performance measurement frameworks 
from the system design also gave rise to risks for policy delivery that were highlighted by the 
Audit Committee on their risk registers. For example, the reduced visibility of functional area 
activities increased the risk of those activities not following municipal policies.  
… central government targets… provided some sort of driver to make sure there was, 
what we call, a golden thread through all the decision making. With that process and 
external reporting being taken away, some of the government's priorities are easy 
targets for cuts… So, from my point of view, I think for governance… they (central 
government) gave us more or less a framework to work within, and now that's not 
there. I do feel that's a risk... possibly decisions can be made by functional areas, 
which are not in accordance with … what the corporate policy is. (Chief accountant) 
 
Additional risk can also arise from the cut back of corporate centre back office functions to 
protect the funding of front line service delivery.  
The back office functions are … the likes of [governance, finance, human resources 
and legal advice]. Frontline guys will have to start to pick up some of that work, or … 
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or you are going to have to start buying that in… IT, for example, is an enabler, but 
it’s always cut first … External IT professionals… some of these guys charge a grand 
[one thousand pounds sterling] a day… Ironically, we will probably need back office 
functions more in the Coalition era than before… (Head of information and 
governance) 
 
In the context of such changes, the usefulness of risk management to protect back office 
enablers to support functional area front line services is becoming clearer. 
 
In the area of risk and performance management the local authority’s management control 
takes into account local performance management and how it can enable outcomes to be met 
by functional areas. However, they also identify potentially unintended consequences and 
risks to service delivery, and how they can be managed. The management controls described 
in this subsection are used flexibly by different functional areas, but counterbalanced by the 
Audit Committee’s monitoring of risks to policy delivery. Such monitoring practices add to 
the internal transparency of local authority management control and institutionalise a 
capability of repair. 
 
(7) Accountability and transparency 
The ultimate concern of public sector corporate governance remains serving the interests of 
external stakeholders, and in particular citizens (IFAC & CIPFA, 2014, p. 6). Under the 
Localism Act 2011 central government abolished performance audit for local authorities with 
the scrapping of the Audit Commission thus weakening formal accountability. Financial audit 
and value for money studies were transferred to the National Audit Office. On the whole, the 
UK central government has to a considerable extent passed on the responsibility to protect the 
interests of citizens through performance management arrangements to the local authorities 
themselves.  
 
The external auditor carrying out NCC’s audit gave an unqualified opinion on the statement 
of accounts for 2012/13 stating that they were in accordance with International Financial 
Reporting Standards and the Code of Practice on Local Authority Accounting in the UK, and 
also gave an unqualified opinion on the value for money conclusion, annual governance 
statement, and whole of government accounts and audit certificate. They commented on 
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financial reporting and management control and gave consideration to the local authority’s 
financial resilience due to the austerity measures. No detailed performance audit was 
undertaken by the external auditor, but instead a transparency agenda demands that all local 
authority transactions over a prescribed value be published online.  
 
At NCC, to assist with accountability the local authority has an independent internal control 
function and an Audit Committee that is independent of the governing body, executive and 
scrutiny functions. It has its own terms of reference, the Chair is independent, and there are 
also two independent members. It submits an Annual Report to the Full Council on its work. 
The internal control systems provide the groundwork for the external auditor. 
 
Global transparency is an important principle of the accountability dimension of the local 
authority’s corporate governance. It enables stakeholders to share specific understandings of 
the local authority’s strategies and corporate governance and assess the extent to which 
specific objectives have been met. The central government’s transparency agenda further 
attempts to promote bottom up accountability practices such as from citizen armchair 
auditors. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
The Coalition government’s localism agenda, and subsequent Localism Act 2011, was 
expected to change fundamentally the context for local authority corporate governance and 
management control in English local authorities. Such devolution to local authorities is a 
trend being considered in many countries. Given the significant changes that can result from 
this trend we contend that research in this area is both timely and important to the effective 
operation of local authorities in many countries. This is even more so in conditions of 
austerity as localism combined with austerity can constitute a powerful external source of 
change. In particular, local authorities find themselves in a position of having to mete out cuts 
that they were not planning to make.  
 
However, we suggest that decentralisation can potentially give rise to enabling corporate 
governance practices. By this we mean that it is possible for local authorities to use their 
corporate governance competencies to pursue their locally determined political priorities with 
specific immediate perceived benefits for the citizenry, by emphasising the transparency, 
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flexibility, and repair of policy planning and delivery. For example, local authorities have 
undertaken their own significant consultations with stakeholders to determine where 
resources should be allocated, for the purposes of expectations management, as a means to 
visibly challenge central government funding, and in attempts at defining and pursuing the 
public interest of their particular community. 
 
By employing the IFAC & CIPFA (2014) framework our case study of NCC sought to flesh 
out some of the ways in which management control practices can facilitate local authority 
corporate governance in the pursuit of the public interest. In this paper, we maintain that even 
after the shift from centralism to localism the relationship between central government and 
local government in England has remained predominantly one between controlling and 
controlled government. We have shown where in the shift from centralism to localism 
specifically enabling elements of control have been added to the predominantly coercive 
control by central government (see table 1).  
 
Overall coercive control is still dominant under localism and exists across all parts of the 
‘hub and spokes’ framework of corporate governance and management control (IFAC & 
CIPFA, 2014), although there has been a shift to relatively more enabling control through 
which locally defined versions of the public interest might be pursued. This is the novelty in 
which our study was interested and the examples in the paper concentrated on these. We 
conclude that local authorities can be subject to coercive controls in some respects and pursue 
the public interest with the aid of enabling corporate governance in others. 
 
The public interest is an amorphous concept whose applicability in corporate governance 
practice needs careful substantiation through fieldwork. IFAC & CIPFA (2014) highlighted 
the importance of integrity, ethics and law; and openness and comprehensive stakeholder 
engagement as being the central hub of public interest. In our view, at NCC the work of the 
fairness commission, the ‘Let’s talk’ initiative, extensive use of online resources for 
information and communication, and other efforts at engaging various stakeholders in 
conversations about how to develop different visions for the city and set spending priorities in 
the context of austerity were complex public deliberation strategies that attempted to define 
and make operational a locally defined notion of the public interest. For example, through 
these complex strategies NCC did more than legitimate cuts and pass back the blame onto the 
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central government. Rather, NCC proactively engaged with stakeholders and made certain 
policy changes, service adaptions, and budget adjustments, for example, with regards to 
respite care budgets, co-optation of citizens in delivery of library services, and pump prime 
funding and philanthropy for the arts. 
 
The changes to the corporate governance hub elements of integrity, ethics and the law and 
openness and stakeholder engagement were supported by a number of specific changes to the 
management control practices of the local authority. Functional areas were given the 
flexibility to set their own agenda for defining outcomes, determining interventions, risk and 
performance management, and leadership and capacity from the bottom up.  The local 
authority’s corporate centre retained important elements of centralised control, in particular 
for overall budget totals. It also, however, used its powers to facilitate repair, for example, by 
making available contingency funds to support politically desirable activities of underfunded 
functional areas.  
 
Looking at the management control practices underpinning the local authority’s corporate 
governance we therefore suggest that a central theoretical finding from this paper is that un-
like in the private sector management control studies where enabling systems were designed 
by head office for operational units (e.g. Ahrens and Chapman, 2004), in collaboration 
between central and local units (e.g. Jorgensen and Messner, 2010) and where performance 
measurement systems can be adapted at the local level during development and 
experimentation (Wouters and Wilderom, 2008’ Wouters and Roijmans, 2011), in our 
example the more bottom up ‘comprehensive’ design of the system itself became an 
important element of the enabling nature of the corporate governance practices for the 
functional area. Performance management systems and targets were not merely implemented 
for hierarchical accountability relationships between the corporate centre and business units 
and/or adapted locally, but instead there was local ownership of performance measurement, 
performance management, empowerment and operations, all of which informed strategy. 
 
The paper also demonstrated how changes in management control systems gave rise to new 
corporate governance practices. For example, management control systems were employed to 
engage individual citizens and service users through ‘Let’s talk’ consultation processes in 
defining outcomes, budget participation meetings to help determine interventions and 
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engagement with institutional stakeholders such as trade unions, chamber of commerce and 
the core cities group of local authorities to lobby central government on the fairness of 
funding settlements. This global transparency from management control systems was 
therefore not specific to NCC, but institutionalised in corporate governance practices across 
the local government field. We call for further studies that can explain how such enabling 
practices of corporate governance can help improve specific strategic competencies to deliver 
public services, especially given the ongoing trend towards commercialisation.   
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Figure 1 – Relationships between Principles for Good Governance in Public Sector 
(Achieving Intended Outcomes While Acting in Public Interest) 
 
 
Source: ‘Hub’ and ‘Spokes’ Wheel Diagram adapted from IFAC & CIPFA (2014) 
International Framework Good Governance in Public Sector 
 
 
A. Behaving with 
integrity, demonstrating 
strong commitment to 
ethical values, and 
respecting the rule of law. 
B. Ensuring openness and 
comprehensive 
stakeholder engagement. 
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Table 1: Changes in Corporate Governance Practices 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
Practice 
Centralism Localism Change in the 
relationship between 
the controlling central 
government & the 
controlled local 
government  
Hub 1 – 
Integrity, 
Ethics and 
Law 
Central government 
imposed, especially 
through Local 
Government Act 
(2000) new Ethical 
Framework which 
created a central 
standards board to 
monitor local 
government ethics 
 
Monitoring of 
standards were 
localised with the 
abolition of the new 
ethical framework and 
central standards 
board, but still many 
centrally prescribed 
statutory rules and 
other laws remain in 
place 
 
Still controlling through 
statute, other laws and 
codes of conduct, but to a 
lesser degree as 
monitoring of standards 
have become more 
localised 
Hub 2 – 
Openness and 
Comprehensive 
Stakeholder 
Engagement 
 
Central government 
imposed Freedom of 
Information Act for 
openness of Local 
Government and 
consultation through 
plethora of  
performance 
management 
frameworks 
 
Central government 
increased openness 
through Transparency 
Agenda, but 
consultation become 
locally determined 
e.g. NCC’s 
stakeholder 
engagement through 
“Lets Talk 
Newcastle” 
 
Controlling of openness 
increased, but reduced for 
stakeholder engagement 
although local 
government maintained 
processes to help 
management control 
spokes of the wheel 
Spoke 1 - 
Defining 
Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
Central government 
imposed service and 
performance planning 
requirements for 
outcomes  
 
 
 
Locally determined 
service and 
performance planning 
for outcomes, but still 
some central 
prescription for 
statutory services  
 
Still controlling by 
prescription of outcomes 
for statutory services 
 
 
 
 
 
Spoke 2 - 
Determining 
Interventions 
Central government 
imposed 
interventions through 
performance 
measurement 
frameworks that were 
managed within 
municipality by 
corporate centre 
Locally determined 
interventions at 
functional area level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Still controlling by 
funding 
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Medium term 
financial strategy and 
balanced budget 
 
 
Financial 
requirements remain 
Spoke 3 - 
Leadership 
and Capacity 
Top down from 
central government to 
corporate centre and 
onto functional units 
 
Specific roles for 
CEO (service 
delivery), Finance 
Director (Balanced 
budget) and 
Monitoring Officer 
(Due processes of 
governance)  
 
Functional Area 
Directors may have 
some statutory 
functions e.g. 
Children Services, 
Adult Services 
 
Bottom up from 
functional areas, with 
central co-ordination 
of overall budget 
 
Specific roles remain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statutory functions 
remain 
Still controlling of 
statutory key roles, but 
not of everyday 
management practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spoke 4 - 
Managing 
Risks and 
Performance 
Central government 
performance 
management 
arrangements e.g. 
Comprehensive Area 
Agreements imposed 
on municipality. 
Managed by 
corporate centre 
 
Centrally imposed 
benchmarks 
 
 
Centrally imposed 
use of resources 
assessment including 
risk management  
Locally determined 
performance 
management 
arrangements by 
functional areas 
 
 
 
 
 
Local benchmarks 
with regional 
comparators 
 
Risk management 
locally determined, 
but still audit of 
internal control 
system 
 
Less controlling as 
balanced budget, and not 
service outcomes and 
means of intervention, 
becomes priority of 
Central Government 
under austerity 
Spoke 5 -  
Accountability 
and 
Transparency 
Audit Commission 
external audit not 
only covered 
financial performance 
Audit Commission 
disbanded. Financial 
audit and value for 
money studies 
Still controlling, but with 
a reduction in formal 
professionalised audit of 
performance being 
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and value for money, 
but operational and 
organisational 
performance 
 
 
 
Transparency through 
‘Freedom of 
Information’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statutory services 
need to be delivered 
transferred to 
National Audit 
Office. Operational 
and organisational 
performance 
assessments scrapped 
 
Transparency through 
‘Freedom of 
Information’ further 
supplemented by 
‘transparency agenda’ 
(all transactions over 
£500 have to be 
published), and a 
‘right to challenge’ 
incumbent service 
provider. So reduction 
in professional audit 
and increase in citizen 
armchair auditors 
 
Statutory services still 
need to be delivered 
 
replaced by increased 
transparency of data and 
informal armchair 
auditors 
 
 
 
